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IN THE UNiTED STATES,
1890 TO 1921
ABSTRACT
Anti-immigrant forces almost succeeded in passing restrictive legislation in 1897, but
their plan did not ultimately materialize for another twenty years. During that time 17 million
Europeans from among the poorest nations came to the United States. This paper explores the
economic and political forces that propped the door open for those twenty years, as well as the
factors that eventually shut it. Economic downturns and their consequent unemployment almost
always brought demands for restriction. The flood of immigrants eventually did result in large
negative effects on the wages of native-born workers. But the political clout of immigrants was
strengthened by the reinforcing nature of their flows. Cities having large numbers of the foreign
born received a disproportionate share of immigrants during the 1900 to 1910 period. After
1910, however, immigrant flows were diluting. This factor and the negative impact of
immigrants on native wages were important in the passage of restrictionist legislation, although





and NBERWith the passage of the Emergency Quota Law in May 1921 the era of open immigration
to the United States came to an end.' The American policy of virtually unrestricted immigration
was transformed, almost overnight, to a quota system that would last until 1965. The change in
policy Is not hard to explain. The perplexing part of the legislative histoiy of immigration
restriction Is its timing. More astonishing than the dosing of the door in 1921 is that it remained
open despite twenty-five years of assault dunng which 17 miliicn immigrants from among the
poorest nations in Europe found refuge In America. This paper details the remarkable set of
events that propped the door open and the forces that eventually slammed It shut.
Because the story of Immigration restriction Is a legislative one, its main players will be
Representatives, Senators, and Presidents. But behind the legislative tale are the shifting interests
of three groups. The first is organized labor, represented by the American Federation of Labor
and the Knights of Labor, and unorganized labor. Owners of capital, Joining together, for
example, through the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Board of Trade, and
Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce In numerous cities, are the second but the most
difficult to categorize. Immigrants, both new and old, are the third.
Controlling segments of these groups united in the 1 890s to form a coalition opposed to
unrestricted Immigration. The coalition nearly succeeded in the late 1890s - Indeed they were
but two votes short — in passing legislation to curtail Immigration. Portions of the coalition
switched sides during the first decade of this century and a new force to champion the cause of
open immigratIon - the recent arrivals themselves - emerged. Capital, which had joined the anti-
immigrant forces in the economically turbulent 1 890s, threw much of its weight on the side of
open immigration In the early 1900s. Congress witnessed several battles over the immigration
Issue during the twenty years following the first vote on the literacy test in 1897. but none
succeeded in altenng the flow of immigration. It has been claimed that it took a world war,
'As I will argue later, the abrupt end should more accurately date with the final passage of
the literacy test in 1917, sInce ft was a simple step to move from the test to a quota.
-1-igniting xenophoblcand staunchlynatMstsentiment, to passImmigrationrestriction. There may
be some truth to that view, but the analysis In this paper suggests that the declining political
power of Immigrant groups and failing real wages for lower-skilled workers after around1910 may
have eventually clinched the vote foi restriction.
The chronology of Immigration restriction will be detailed first. The history Is well known
and has been recounted elsewhere (Hlgham 1955, Hutchlson 1981, Jones 1992 2nd ed., Taylor
1971). My emphasis will be on shifting coalitions and their economic and political bases as
inferred from aggregate economIc activity and the votes in Congress. I then move to a more in-
depth analysis of city-level wage data by occupation and Industry from 1890 to 1923 to ascertain
the possible economic bases of support.
The wage data reveal substantial negative effects of Immigration for both laborers and
artisans, although the effects by Industry are less clear. The Impact, moreover, appears to have
increased from the 1890 to the early 1 920s corresponding to the rise in negative sentiment toward
open Immigration In the Immediate pre-Wodd War I period. FInally, voting in the House is linked
to the strength of the wage effect and to the proportion of the population that was foreign born.
The greater was the increase k-s wages in particular cities, the lower was the percentage of
Representatives in the state who voted for restriction. But the greater the percentage foreign born
in these cities, the lower the sentiment for restriction in the state. The desire to restrict was,
therefore, tempered by the composition of the electorate. Most importantly, and similar to
developments in the United States of late, the foreign born may ultimately have been scapegoats
for economic factors in certain local labor markets.
The Uteracy Test
The history of European immigration restriction begins with the movement to pass the
-2-literacy test, succeeding ultimately in 191 7•2 Quotas and other types of blanket restrictions were
not seriously considered in the House or the Senate prior to i920. Of the multitude of
regulations considered only two could have seriously restricted Immigration — the financial and
literacy tests. Only the literacy test received serious deliberation.4
Not only was the literacy test given careful consideration, it passed the House on five
separate occasions and passed the Senate on tour. Further, the House overrode presidential
vetoes of the bill twice and on two occasions failed to override by fewer than 7 votes. The Senate
overrode a presidential veto once when the test became law In 1917.
The literacy test was to be administered to physically capable adults to assess their ability
to read. Although the test varied in the many pieces of immigration legislation in which it was a
section, it generally consisted of reading several sentences of the Constitution In any language
chosen by the potential immigrant, including recognized dialects. Some of the proposed
legislation also required that the immigrant be capable of writing the sentences he could read.
2lmmigration was restricted and regulated In various ways in addition to the literacy test and,
eventually, quotas, but none was of great quantitative significance. Of most importance is that
the restrictions placed on Asians will not be treated in any detail here. See, for example, Higham
(1955) for a defense of limiting attention to European immigration. It should be noted, as well,
that immigration from the Western Hemisphere was not restricted by the 1921, 1924, and 1929
quotas, although the literacy test was unaffected by that legislation.
3Vanous influential groups had, prior to the passage of the quotas, Petitioned Congress to
end immigration for some period of time. The AFL in December 1918, requested that Congress
curtail immigration for at least two years (Higham 1955). DurIng the debates over the quota
legislation in the aftermath of World War I several bills were introduced that would have
suspended immigration for periods of from three to fIve years (Hutchison 1981. p 171). Of the
many possible means of restricting and regulating immigration contained in the Immigration
Commission Report of 1910 none was a blanket quota of the type eventually adopted In 1921,
1924, and 1929. One suggested means that would have limited the number of each race
arrMng each year to a certain percentage of the average of that race arriving during a given
period of yearv (U.S. Senate 1911. p. 47).
4Sectlon 39 of the immigration bill Introduced in 1906 contaIned a financial test that would
have required, among other things, that all male immigrants over sixteen years old (or the male
head of the househok have $25 or its equivalent (Hutchison 1981, p. 139). The final version of
the 1907 act did not contain this provision. An amount of $25 was 2.4 weeks of income for lower-
skilled manufacturing labor in America in 1906 and about 9 weeks of income for an equivalent
worker In southern and eastern Europe at the time (Historical StatIstics 1975. series D 778;
Slmkovich, Taylor, and Williamson 1992).Clou relatives of an adult male immigrant who was literate were often exempted. Because the
shipping companies that brought immigrants across the ocean were responsible for the return
voyage of any who did not meet U.S. immigration standards, it is likelythat these companies
would have administered a literacy test of their own, in the same way that they screened for
health violations in European poits.
The literacy test first came to a vote in Congress in 1897 and was overwhelmingly passed
by the House and cleared a majority in the Senate (see the chronology In Table 1). At least one
other bill was proposed during the debate In the House which could have been even more
restnctive and which would have restricted immigration from any port not having a consular
inspection station in Europe.
Several factors operated In the mid-i 890s to create a short-lived coalition, yet one that
would surface again, In some form, around regulating and restricting Immigration. The leadership
and members of the American Federation of Labor and the Knights of Labor came out strongly
in favor of the literacy test in 1897, but had not done so before. The depression of the 1 890s with
its extremely high rates of unemployment, particularly in the manufacturing sector, appears
responsible for the change of heart.5 But capital, too, turned against immigration.
Industry had depended on immigrant labor and thus the restrictionist sentiment of certain
associations of capitalists may seem inexplicable. The labor unrest of the 1 880s and early 1 890s,
fresh in the minds of many, may have been a deciding factor. In addition to a rash of strikes
there were particularly odious events, such as the Homestead strike of 1892 and the Haymarket
not of 1886. The business faction that united against immigration in the last two decades of the
nineteenth century Is not easily categorized (Heald 1953, Wiebe 1962). Its motivation was short-
run, it seems, and it disintegrated rapidly once economic conditions improved, labor unrest
The AFL letter to Congress in 1898 also argued that laborers are imported from other
countries to reduce our wages and thereby our standard of kvlng (U.S. Congress Conaressional
Record Senate, vol. 31, p. 686). The AFL like others, was arguing against contract labor and the
enticing of immigrants by shipping and railroad companies to emigrate to the United States.
-4-Table I
Immigration Restriction Chronology: Votes on the Literacy Test
Date Branch of Government Vote Notes
2/9/97 House 217-36-102' affirmatIve vote on bill
2/17/97 Senate 34-31-25 affirmatIve vote on bill
3/2/97 President Cleveland veto
3/3/97 House 195-37-123 overrIdes presidential veto
3/3/97 Senate takes no action, bill dies
1/17/98 Senate 45-28-16 affirmatIve vote on bill
12/14/98 House 101-104-150 negative vote on consideration
of bill
5/27/02 House no vote found affirmative vote on bill, literacy
test dropped in House-Senate
conference
6/25/06 House 128-116 vote to remove literacy test from
immigration bill and to set up
Immigration Commission
4/19/12 Senate 9-56-30 vote was to strike the literacy
test from the bill; affirmative vote
on bill, sent to conference
12/18/12 House 179-52 affirmative vote on bill, sent to
conference
2/14/13 President Taft veto
2/19/13 House 213-114-54 falls to override
1/2/15 Senate 50-7-39 affirmative vote on bill
1/15/15 House 227-94-103 affirmative vote on conference
report of bill
President Wilson veto
2/4/15 House 261-136-26 falls to override
3/30/16 House 307-87-39 affirmative vote on bill
12/14/16 Senate 64-7-25 affirmative vote on bill
President Wilson veto
2/1/17 House 287-106-40 overrides veto
2/5/17 Senate 62-19-5 overrides veto
'Hutchinson reports those not voting as 125 not 102.
Sources: Hutchinson (1955); U.S. Congress, Congressional Record. 62nd, 63rd, and 64th sessions, House
and Senate.
Notes: Roll call votes count those not voting whereas non-roll call votes have only pro and con.subsided, and wage decreases from immigration were more apparent.
The face of Immigration changed rapidly in the 1890s, moving from northern Europe to
southern, central, and eastern Europe. Whereas the new immigrants were 35 percent of the total
flow in 1890, they were 56 percent in 1896, although the flow was of comparatively modest size
in the mid-I 890s, a product of economic depression (see Figures 1 and 2).' It has been claimed
that the new immigrants were too recent and too few to motivate policy (Higham 1955). A reading
of the Congressional Record affords ample reason to disagree with this claim, but not with a
related assertion that the new immigrants were too recent and too few to influence policy.1 But
they would be fortified by numbers and unified by fear in a very brief period.
President Cleveland vetoed the immigration legislation in 1897 because It contained the
literacy test, and although the House voted to override his veto, the Senate took no action and
the bill died. Just one year later, in 1898, a similar immigration law was proposed in Congress.
In this case the bill cleared the Senate but failed to pass the House by 3 votes, which had just
a year before given it overwhelming support.' The flip-flopping that took place on this important
Issue extended to the executive branch as well. Although Cleveland vetoed the act in 1897 his
successor, Mckinley, ran on a Republican platform that called for the literacy test. Thus the
binding constraint in 1898 was the House, whereas the constraint just a year before was the
Senate. Had just 2 Representatives changed their vote to pro from con, the literacy test would
'New immigrants are those from southern and eastern Europe. I have included the non-
German speaking emigrants from Austria in eastern Europe.
to Hlgham (1955) the Immigration Protection League, organized primarily by the
older immigrant groups in the late 1 890s, led the defeat of the 1898 literacy requirement in the
House.
'Of the 45 yeas In the Senate in 1898, 23 voted affirmatively in 1897, 6 had voted negatively,
9 had been recorded as absent, and 7 were new members of the Senate. Had all those present
In both 1897 and 1898 voted as they did in 1898, the vote would have been 37 for and 22
against The new members of the Senate in 1898 split their votes about even for the test in 1898.
Thus it was the disproportionate exit of the negative votes, primarily Democrats, that Increased
the strength of the pro-restriction coalition, primarily Republican. See Higham (1955) who claims
the bill passed the Senate In 1898 along party lines.have become law in le98.
The literacy test passed the House again In 1902 but was dropped In House-Senate
conference, and was not again incorporated Into an Immigration act until 1906. Through the
political maneuvering of Representative Joe Cannon, Speaker of the House, the House voted in
1906 to remove the literacy test and sot up the Immigration Commission to explore the matter in
greater depth. The now-famous 42 volume Report of the Immigration Commission was Issued in
1910. In it was a call for a literacy test to regulate the flow of immigrants. A majority of the
Commission favor the reading and writing test as the most feasible single method of restricting
undesirable immigration.. . The Commission as a whole recommends restriction as demanded
by economic, moral, and social considerations (U.S. Senate 1911, vol I, p. 48). On the heels
of the report, the literacy test was reintroduced in Congress In 1912.
From 1898, the previous vote on the literacy test In Congress, to 1912, the next vote, were
14 years of extraordina,y Immigrant flow particularly from southern and eastern Europe. The
relative silence in Congress on the literacy test Is afi the more curious. It might be claimed,
however, that the halls were actually not silent There had been a vote in 1902 and the test was
almost incorporated into legislation In 1906. With the creation of the Immigration Commission,
Congress may have felt obliged to wait for its report since its directive was to assess immigration
restriction. Another interpretation is that shifting Interests were at work. Although organized labor
remained against unrestricted Immigration, capital had shIfted decisively. Looking more toward
its long-run interests in holding down wages, capital put aside its fears that labor unrest would
be fueled by foreign agitators. Perhaps of most importance was the emergence of a pivotal group
in the form of the new immigrants, who were vocal and rapidly gaining the franchise.'°
assumption here is the President McKinley, having run on a platform advocating the
literacy test, would not have vetoed the bill.
'°The new immigrants have been portrayed by many as a potent force In big city politics
during the Progressive era, but recent data on the percentage of the foreign born In major cities
who were eligIble to vote raises questions about their strength (see Keyssar, In progress).
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Figure 2: Proportion of Immigrants from Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe, 1880101930
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1890 1900 1910 1920 1930Both the Senate and House passed the literacy test again in 1912 only to have it vetoed
by lame-duck President Taft. The House failed by just 6 votes to override the veto. Had it been
able to override, the test would have become law since the Senate vote was 86 percent in favor
of the amendment on the literacy test. The literacy test was reintroduced in 1915, passing the
Senate by a wide majority and the House by enough to override a veto but with a large segment
not voting. President Wilson, an ardent Progressive remembering his promise to immigrants in
the 1912 election, vetoed the legislation, and the House failed to ovemde it, this time by just 5
votes. In 1916 the House and Senate once again passed a bill containing the literacy test and
finally, in 1917, both houses successfully overrode Wilson's second veto. The literacy test
became law.
The literacy test was merely an overture to the Emergency Quota Act passed in 1921 • the
Immigration Act of 1924, and, eventually, the National Origins Act passed in 1929. Although the
quotas were plausibly more potent than the literacy test, the test could have imposed
considerable constraints paiticularly on the new immigrant groups. How much of a constraint
depends on the type of test, the sending country flows, and the period considered.
As initially conceived in 1897. the literacy test involved reading and writing a short
passage of the U.S. Constitution and barred Illiterate adult males and their accompanying family
members. At that time it was believed that the test would have barred 25 percent of all recent
arrivals, although more than 40 percent of the newer groups would have been.'1 More precise
estimates were compiled for the Immigration Commission Report According to the Repoit, data
collected by the U.S. Commissioner-General of Immigration from the self-reported statements of
70% were, but that states often had residence requirements that the mobile foreign born often
could not meet. The evidence presented here supports, in principle, the assertions of the older
literature. The foreign born might have been an even more potent force had naturalization been
faster and had various states had more lenient residency requirements.
"During the debate on the Immigration act of 1898, Senator Fairbanks of Indiana inserted
data in the Congressional Record showing that about 25 percent of immigrants (14 years old and
over) arriving from 1895 to 1897 were illiterate. Illiteracy was declared by the immigrant and no
official test was given (U.S. Congress. Conoressional Record 1898, Senate, vol. 31, p. 515).
-7-Immigrants upon arrival Indicated that 33.4 percent of eastern European and 44.9 percent of
southern European immigrants (14 years and older) arriving during the period from 1899 to 1910
were illiterate.'2 Thus the test would have reduced the number of all new Immigrant groups by
37.4 percent In 1907 at the height of Immigration. The constraint would have been less In the
1 920s due to rising literacy in eastern and southern Europe, although the test could have been
made more difficult.'3
For the entire 1905 to 1914 period, a decade of immigrant flows of more than 1 million
per year, the literacy test would have restricted Immigration from southern and eastern Europe
to about 445,000 annually when the flow was, in actuality, 712,000.14 But the eventual quotas
were far more restrictive. The 1921 act limited southern and eastern Europeans to 156,000 and
the 1924 and 1929 acts lowered it further to just over 20,000, a mere trickle. Put in terms of total
immigration, from 1905 to 1914 730,000 would.have entered each year had there been a literacy
test, whereas the 1921 act called for about halt that number. The 1924 and 1929 acts stipulated
'2Female Immigrants were less literate than male immigrants. Becausemany versions of the
literacy test allowed the illiterate family members of a literate adult male immigrant to emigrate,
the constraird would have been less than calculated on the basis of the aggregate data But
younger adults were more literate than older adult Immigrants and since the Immigration
Commission data group all ages, this factor would tend to bias the calculation in the other
direction. The data from the U.S. Commissioner-General ci' Immigration in the Immigration
Commission Report (1911, voL 1, p. 99) dIffer, often radically by country, from those reported in
the Congressional Record (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1898, vol. 31, p. 516) for a somewhat earlier
period of time. But the data in the Immigration Commission Report are consistent with estimates
I have computed using the 1910 Public Use Micro-data Sample (RUMS).
13 Primwy school enrollment had beenrising secularly in Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, and
Rumania across the latter halt of the nineteenth century and exploded In Russia after the
revolution. See, for example, the data in Easterlin (1981).
'4Emlgration to the United States tram Europe could have slowed in the 19205 as Conditions
improved in certain European countries relative to those In the United States. Wage data
collected for a project on International economic convergence (Slmkovlch, Taylor, and Williamson
1992) indicate that Italy, the only new himigrant country in the data set, Improved its real wage
position relative to the United States during the 1900$ to 1920$ period. In 1910, for example, the
ratio of italian to American real wages for unskilled laborers was 0.29, but by 1925 It was 0.48.
It should also be noted that even though gross Immigration was 6.71 million from 1908
to 1914, many immigrants returned home. The net immigration figure Is 61 percent ci' thegross
or 4.07 mIllion (Willcox 1931, p. 88).
-8-amounts that were one-quarter to one-fifth the hypothetical flows. Thus the literacy test, even as
conceived in 1897, would have imposed rather stringent restrictions on the new immigrants,
although not nearty as harsh as those eventually imposed by the 1929 National Origins Act
The votes on the literacy test Indicate the shifting coalitions mentioned earlier. The first
vote in the House, in 1897, brought southern and urban-northeastern interests together in
opposition to the test with virtually the rest of the country favoring it'5 The South clung to the
hope that immigrants would eventually settle there; the northeast voted Its constituents' personal
interests and it continued to do so on this point into the twentieth century. By the second vote,
in 1912 and that in 1913 to override the veto, the South finally acknowledged that Immigrants
would never flock there, and anti-foreign sentiment on the basis of race had emerged. With the
exception of Louisiana, the South was united in favor of restriction and only portions of the urban
northeast and midwest were firmly k-i opposition to it The election of 1916 removed enough
opponents to the test that the override of the presidential veto was assured. In fact, had the vote
been taken of those in office at the previous session, it would not have passed over Wilson's veto.
Party affiliation had nothing to do with the shift in the vote. Those opposed to the literacy test had
been voted out of office.
The fact that there were three votes on the literacy test by three successive seatings of
the House enables one to see how the changed composition of the electorate altered the
outcome (see Table 2)." Comparing first the votes of those Representatives who voted in both
the 62nd (1912/13) and 63rd (1914/15) Congresses, 74 percent voted for the literacy test. Thus
the incumbent members of the House were overwhelmingly in favor of restriction in 1915. The
"Of the 37 negative votes, 25 were cast by southerners. Three from New York City joined
them together with 8 others from urban areas in the northeast. One additional Representative,
from Wisconsin, voted against the test (U.S. Congress, Conaressional Record House, vol. 31?,
p. 2947).
"I am looking only at the voting record of the House because the Senate passed the test by
wide enough margins in 1912/13, 1914/15, and 1916/17 to override a Presidential veto. The
Senate would be expected to be more supportive of restrictive Immigration than the House, in




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 recently seated members of the House did amass a majority in favor of restriction, but they did
so just barely. Only 55 percent voted for the test in 1915, clearly not enough to override a
presidential veto. Thus it was the newly elected Representatrves who held the literacy test at bay,
suggesting that big-city districts had changed composition. The new immigrants themselves, it
seems, managed to elect Representatives who voted disproportionately against the literacy test.
But if this were the only change in the House, the vote would have become less In favor of the
act over time. Rather, the percentage voting In favor remained at 65 percent. Those who were
voted out of office were in favor of the keeping the door open to the same degree as those who
took their place. Thus the vote In 1913 would have cleared the two-thirds needed to override had
only those who kept their seats to 1915 voted. Those who were defeated in 1914 voted far more
decidedly against restriction, although with a majority in favor of the literacy test.
The old guard in the 1913 and 1915 votes were pro-restriction. The young turks and
those who suffered defeat at the polls in 1914 were less restrictionist The new members - the
young turks - hailed primarily from the large and Industrial cItIes of the northeast and midwest,
whereas those defeated in 1914 came from small to mIddle-sized tewns across America. Those
suffering defeat, therefore, were replaced by Representatives far less in favor of open immigration.
But the new turks were able to make up the difference and prop the door open. America had
become more bifurcated along the lines of open immigration, and it was redistricting in 1914 that
rescued the pro-immigration bloc.17 Without it, the anti-forces would have won. The increased
population of the nation's big and industrial cities, with its largely immigrant composition, was
The possibility that it was redistricting is by inference only. There were 45 additional
Representatives seated in the 63rd Congress than in the 62nd Congress, and there were 43 more
Representatives present for the vote in the 63rd than in the 62nd Congress to override the
President's veto (see Table 1). Much of the redistricting took place within states, it appears. A
tabulation of Representatives by state does not reveal much difference between the two
Congresses. But New York City, for example, gained 7 Representatives Among those who were
not seated In the 62nd Congress but who voted in the 63rd, there were 9 from New York City who
voted against the test. Two Representatives from New York City were not reelected, one of whom
was against and one of whom was for the test. Three of the newly elected Representatives were
from Philadelphia which only lost one seat from the 62nd to the 63rd Congresses. Chicago,
however, made no net gain.
-10-responsible for keeping the anti-immigrant forces just below the two-thirds majority needed to
override. All changed by 1917. however, when there was no relationship between incumbency
and the vote on the literacy test. All in the House — save those whose seats were in the center
of the nation's largest cities — voted overwhelmingly for It regardless of time in office and party
affiliation.
The Economic Basis for Immigration Restriction
Almost all serious calls for the literacy test were preceded by economic downturns, some
of major proportion, and few economic downturns of the era were not accompanied by a call for
restriction in the halls of Congress. Unemployment and labor unrest were clearly In the minds of
legislators in the 1897 and 1898 votes, and economic conditions had worsened just as the 1915
literacy test came to a vote. The major recession just following World War I was a factor in the
Emergency Quota Act. But the clamor for restriction at particular junctures in our histoty must
have been reinforced by other economic forces, some national and long run in nature and some
specific to the cities and periods that experienced the greatest Influxes, Immigrants, no matter
where they went In the United States, had economic effects on those already In the country no
matter where they lived and worked. But the Initial impact that immigrants had on wage levels
of their close substitutes In production must have been greatest In the local labor markets to
which the Immigrants originally went and in which most remained. The long-run story of general
wage rate changes with the flood of Immigrants since the late 1840s Is one of enormous
importance on an international scale. That most relevant to the political economy of restriction
is somewhat of a more short-run tale.
The literacy test was Introduced and gained momentum because Immigration In the 1890s
had shifted to ethnic and national groups whose schooling levels and living standards were
18 See Hatton and Williamson(1992) on the general Issue of wage rate changes with large-
scale immigration on an International level.
—11-distinctly below those of previous groups. They were, moreover, disproportionately male and
were often 'birds of passage,' who spent only brief durations in America Such individuals were
a perceived a threat to the American working man. By toiling long hours and bringing living
standards from low-wage countries, they probably did lower the wage-hours offer curve by more
than an equivalent Increase In native-born workers would have. Moreover, because they
frequently lacked rudimentary skills in reading and writing, and more often in English, they may
have earned even less than competitive forces would have dictated.19 These were certainly the
claims of many observers of the day — Progressives, conservatives, and labor movement
organizers alike. Although each group had its own solution, a dominant one was to restrict
immigration on the basis of literacy.
Occupations and Destinations of Immigrants, 1890 to 1920
Certain occupations and industries were disproportionately composed of immigrants
whereas others were not. if recently-arrived immigrants were more closely substitutable for other
foreign-born workers and lesser-skilled workers than for native-born higher-skilled workers, then
the wage effects should be more negative in industries and occupations having a large
percentage foreign born and lesser skilled. The percentage of the labor force that was foreign
born by Industry and for selected occupations in 1910 is given in Table 3. The foreign born are
divided into three groups - all foreign born, the new immigrants, by which is meant those from
eastern, central, and southern Europe, and among the new Immigrants those who emigrated
within the 10 years preceding the 1910 census, what are termed 'recent' immigrants.
All manufacturing employments were more heavily populated by immigrants than was the
male labor force as a whole, although a substantial fraction of the differential Is accounted for by
the disproportIonate employment of native-born workers in agriculture. Excluding the agricultural
19 See, for example, Hannon (1982) for empirical evidence on the extent of labor market


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 sector, foreign born workers were 1.4 times as likely to have been in the goods-producing sector
than were native-born workers, and the new Immigrants were almost 1.6 times as likely.20
Among the industries most populated by the new and recent immigrants were clothing, mining,
and iron and steel. But there was substantial variation in the ethnic backgrounds of workers
within industries; in foundries, for example, 32 percent of the laborers were of the new and recent
group of immigrants but only 4 percent of the machinists were.
Immigrants went disproportionately to the nation's largest cities but so did all Americans
during the period under study. Despite the notion that immigrants, particularly from 1900101914.
crowded themselves into a handful of America's urban centers, they were In fact extremely
disbursed across all cities regardless of size.2'Indeed, the change in the foreign born
population from 1900 to 1910 was, on average, the same across almost all deciles of the size
distributlqn of cities in 1900. The 15 cities with the largest and smallest increases the proportion
foreign born in their populations are given in Table 4, part A for 1890 to 1900 and 1900 to 1910.
No city in the top decile (decile = 10) is included in the 15 having the largest increases from 1890
101900, and there are many small cities represented among the ranks of those accumulating the
foreign born at a faster rate than they accumulated native-born residents. And while there Is
some repetition in the top and bottom lists across the decades, there Is also a lot of movement
Immigrants went to different cities in different decades. They went where there were jobs and,
as will be demonstrated in Table 5, they went where their earning power would be highest.
Also of importance in assessing the political economy of immigration restriction Is whether
Immigrants went to areas already populated by immigrants. To the extent that Immigration
begot Immlgratlon, certain cities and Congressional districts within them would have become
20The goods-producing sector is mining, manufacturing, and construction.
21 The one exception - and It Is an important one — Is New York City. There are 143 cities
inthe 1890to lgoOsampleand l27inthe 190010 l9lOsample. (Thesearethecitiesinthe BLS
wages and hours studies for the various time periods.) The earlier sample includes more small
cities, although the deciles have been recomputed for each decade.
-13-Table 4
Changes in the Proportion Foreign Born by City, 1890 to 1920
A. Fifteen cities with the largest and smallest increases in proportion foreign born in the population (AFB):
1890 to 1900, and 1900 to 1910a
1890 to 1900
Largest Increases FB Decileb Smallest IncreasesAFB Decileb
New Bedford, MA0.056 6 SI Paul, MN -0.112 9
Passaic, NJ 0.055 2 Spokane, WA -0.103 5
Hartford, CT 0.025 7 Duluth, MN -0.093 5
Bridgeport, CT 0.023 7 Portland, OR -0.081 8
Tampa, FL 0.0181 Milwaukee, WI -0.077 10
Middletown, CT 0.0181 Seattle, WA -0.076 7
Uncoin, NE 0.014 4 Davenport, IA -0.071 3
Nashua, NH 0.013 2 Neenah, WI -0.0701
Providence, RI 0.0119 Tacoma, WA -0.069 4
Pueblo, CO 0.010 2 Saginaw, MI -0.067 4
Lynn, MA 0.009 7 Minneapolis, MN -0.0679
New London, CT 0.0081 Holyoke, MA -0.0655
Somerville, MA 0.008 6 Chicago, IL -0.064 10
Brockton, MA 0.006 4 Dubuque, IA -0.063 3
Schenectady, NY0.005 3 Cincinnati, OH -0.063 10
1900 to 1910
Largest Increases FB Decileb Smallest IncreasesFB Decileb
Johnstown, PA 0.072 3 Davenport, IA -0.0522
Passaic, NJ 0.056 3 FaIl River, MA -0.0507
Lynn, MA 0.051 6 Covington, KY -0.0503
St. Joseph, MO 0.050 5 Clinton, IA -0.0491
Brooklyn, NY 0.047 10 Saginaw, Ml -0.0382
Utica, NY 0.044 5 Fort Worth, TX .0.0373
Trenton, NJ 0.044 6 Quincy, IL -0.0371
Elizabeth, NJ 0.043 5 Troy, NY -0.0365
Youngstown, OH0.043 5 Oshkosh, WI -0.035 1
Spokane, WA 0.043 7 Dubuque, IL -0.0331
Bridgeport, CT 0.042 7 Evansville, IN -0.0314
Bayonne, NJ 0.042 3 Peoria, IL -0.0284
New Haven, CT 0.042 8 Salt Lake City, UT -0.0276
Canton, OH 0.041 2 Louisville, KY -0.026 9
New Bedford, MA0.039 6 St. Paul, MO -0.0238
B. Regression of Difference in % Foreign Born between t and (t + 10) on % Foreign Born in Year td
Coeff. (t-stat.) on Dept. Variable Mean
% Foreign Born No. Obs. R2 Unwted. Wted.
1890 to 1900 -0.135 (.10.4) 127 0.68-0.0296 -0.0373
1900 to 1910 0.192 (1.86) 127 0.27 0.00450.0131
1910 to 1920 -0.119 (.11.2) 115 0.52-0.0298 -0.0390C. Regression of Difference In % Foreign Born between t and (t + 10) on Log of Population in Year td
Coeff. (t-stat) on
Log Population No. Obs. R2
1890 to 1900 -0.0041 (-3.20) 127 0.52
1900 to 1910 0.0053 (4.26) 127 0.42
1910 to 1920 -0.0057 (-5.31) 115 0.19
a The cities are those In the sample for the wage regressions. There are 142 cities for 1890 to 1900 and
127 for 1900 to 1910. The change In the proportion foresgn born In the popu'ation Is calculated as (e.g..
1900 to 1910): percentage (white) foreign born in 1910 - percentage (white) foreign born in 1900. It is
a percentage point change and Is Identical to the dependent variable in the wage regressions in Table
6.
b The city's decile Is in the distribution of cities by population for 1900. A 10 means the top decile and
a 1 Is the lowest.
city's decile Is In the distribution of cities population for 1910.
d Alt regressions are weighted by the population in the baseyear. The 1890 to 1900 and 1900 to 1910
regressions also contain regional dummy variables; that for 1910 to 1920 does not, at present.
Sources:
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures (varIous years).
U.S. Bureau of the census, Census of Population (various years).even more disproportionately immigrant in makeup and thus more inclined to oppose immigration
restriction. Part B of Table 4 reports the results of the regression of the difference in the
percentage foreign born across a decade on the percentage foreign born in the earlier year, that
is A [% Foreign Bom,, 1+10)1 is run on % Foreign Born1. Interestingly, the coefficient is negative for
the 1890 to 1900 and 1910 to 1920 decades, but positive for the 1900 to 1910 decade.
Immigration was reinforcing or concentrating in its impact from 1900 to 1910. Thus immigration
restriction was held at bay during the Iaigest immigrant flows because the new immigrants were
able to capture various Congressional districts. By the 1910 to 1920 decade, however, the flows
had a more diluting impact. Also note that only during the decade of the greatest immigration,
that from 1900 to 1910, did immigrants flow Into America's cities at the same rate that native-born
Americans populated the same urban areas. The percentage foreign born actually fell during the
1890 to 1900 and 1910 to 1920 decades in the cities under study. Similar notions are apparent
in part C of Table 4. During the 1890 to 1900 and 1910 to 1920 decades, the percentage foreign
born In the urban population declined where population grew, but the reverse occurred from 1900
to 1910. Only in the 1900 to 1910 decade did the fastest growing cities also increase their
population share of the foreign born. These burgeoning urban areas gained Representatives who
held the pro-restriction movement at bay, at least for a while.
Wage Data by City, 1890 to 1923
Economists have, for some time, pondered the wage effects of the enormous influx of less
skilled workers In the first two decades of this century. Paul Douglas's (1930) pioneering volume
on wages from 1890 to 1926 concluded that real wages in manufacturing rose by 8 percent or
only 0.32 percent average annually from 1890 to 1914, the period of greatest immigration. The
increase from 1919 to 1926, according to Douglas, was an astounding 3.3 percent average
The same cities have been used for the 1890 to 1900 and 1900 to 1910 regressions. There
are twelve fewer cities for the 1910 to 1920 regression.
-14-.annually, whereas that in real wages in the several decades before 1890 was more on the order
of 1.5 percent average annually. By implication, then, immigration had decreased the earning
power of manufacturing workers.
But Douglas's findings were questioned by Albert flees whose construction of a new
consumer price index altered Douglas's central conclusion. According to flees's estimates, real
wages rose by 40 percent from 1890 to 1914 or 1.4 percent average annually (1975, 1st publ.
1961, p. 120). By Implication, immigration had not altered the course of real wages in the
manufacturing sector. The aggregate economy, it appeared, had enormous absorptive capacity
for new workers.24
But even flees's wage data, when contrasted with those for lower skilled workers,
suggest that immigration depressed wages.Figure 3 graphs the data from flees for
manufacturing workers (total and union) and those from Coombs for lower skilled workers
Although the flees data increase at about the same rate for the entire 1890 to 1914 period, that
for the lower skllled workers does not. It slows down In Its Increase, flattens out, and then
declines sometime after 1907. Note that the unionized workers series, which Is for those In
manufacturing, Is quite anomalous with respect to the other two series. Not only does It remain
See Douglas (1930) whose series are reproduced in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975),
series D 766 for nominal wages and E 185 for the price indeL
24 This Is also a conclusion of Hatton and Williamson (1992) based, in part, on Williamson
(1982) who concludes, on the basis of the computable general equilibrium model, that despite
the generally large absorptive capacity of the economy, it was lowest around the World War I
period.
Although Roes (1961) and Douglas (1930) used data fora large group of manufacturing
workers, one might want wages for only unskilled manufacturing workers. One wage series for
such workers shows a far slower growth of hourly wages from 1890 to 1914 than for all
manufacturing workers and an even slower one during the period of peak Immigration, from 1900
to 1914. Real hourly wages of less-skilled manufacturing workers increased by 0.709 percent
average annually from 1890 to 1914, and by 0.566 percent average annually from 1900 to 1914
(David and Solar 1977).
These data are from Historical Statistics, series D 766, 768, and 778 for the wage series.
flees's cost-of-living Index (series E 186) is used for 1890 to 1914 and is spliced to Douglas's
(series E 185) for 1914 to 1926. I credit the series to Roes because it was his revision of the



















Figure 3: Log of the Real Hourly Wage, 1890 to 1930
Source: Historical Statistics (1975) series D 766, 768, and 778 for the wage series. Rees's cost-of-IMng
index (series E 186) is used for 1890 to 1914 and is spliced to Douglas's (series E 185) for 1914 to 1926.
Lower skilled workers
1900 1910 1920level from 1900 to 1914, it decreases during World War I rather than rising, as do the other two
series.
Rees's evidence, like Douglas's, was indirect and only by inference could he conclude
that immigrants had only a very small impact on the real wages of American manufacturing
workers. He did not directly estimate the effect of immigration on the wages of workers. To get
a more direct estimate of the economic Impact of immigrants would require a cross section of
labor markets each receMng immigrants in different proportions to the existing population. But
a single cross-section of cities may be insufficient Immigrants sought particular labor markets
that paid high wages. With city-level observations for two cross sections one can estl,ate a
difference equation that gets around part of the simultaneity problem. Ironically, the same data
that both Douglas and Rees used to construct their nominal wage series are precisely those that
contain the type of observations needed and used in this study.
Data on hourly and weekly wages for particular occupations and industries by city are
available for much of the period of interest, although they are not uniform across the entire period.
For the 1890 through 1907 period there are the BLS wages and hours series for non-unionized
employees that were used by Paul Douglas and Albert Rees, among others. As many as 100
cities were surveyed for each of about twenty occupations with information on hourly earnings
given annually. For the 1907 to 1923 period the BLS wages and hours series covers unionized
workers In 13 occupatIons across 66 cities.
In the data from 1890 to 1907, two groups of occupations have been selected for study.
The first Includes four types of laborers — working in foundries, by contract on streets and sewers,
in municipal street and sewer work, and In the building trades as common laborers and as hod
carriers. A second group includes skilled workers - painters, bricklayers, plasterers, plumbers,
and machinists working in foundries and machine shops. The series through 1903 is contained
in the 19th Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor (U.S. Commissioner of Labor 1905) and
is continued through 1907 in the subsequent BLS wages and hours series, although with a
-16-reduced number of cities. After 1907 the series covers only unionized employees by occupation.
In the data from 1907 to 1923 there are only skilled workers and their helpers — bricklayers,
carpenters, wiremen and their helpers, painters, steamfitters and their helpers, and iron finishers
and their helpers. Both sets of data — those for the nonunlonized sample and the unionized —
contain hourly wages by year and occupation for a large number of cities. That for the
nonunionized group contains the number of workers in the occupation-city cell, whereas that for
the unionized group does not.
Among the building tradesmen, laborers had about the same proportion new and recent
Immigrants as did the entire goods-producing labor force. Painters and masons, however, were
disproportionately native born (see Table 3), although a large fraction of the masons were older
immigrant groups, such as Germans. Among street and sewer workers 22 percent were the new
and recent immigrants whereas only 1 2 percent of all in the entire goods-producing sector were,
yielding a relative proportion of 1.8.
City-level earnings data can also be found in the censuses of manufacturing for 1899,
1904, 1909, and 1914. The data in this source are by industry, not occupation. They are, in
addition, for all employees, not just adult males, although for some of the industries men were the
bulk of the labor force. Annual earnings per employee, not hourly wages, are available for each
of the four years considered.
Four industries — men's clothing, printing and publishing, bread and bakery products, and
foundries - were chosen to span the various characteristics of workers and products. The most
serious constraint on the choice of industries was that the number of cities represented had to
be substantial and not many industries were found in a large enough sample of cities. Further,
the choice of Industries was governed by the skills and ethnic composition of workers. The nature
of the product, as will be apparent soon, was also a consideration.
The data on street and sewer workers are not included in Table 3. Foreign born workers
were 49.4 percent of all Street laborers, the new immigrants were 30.5 percent, and the new and
recent immigrants were 22.0 percent.
-17-Men's clothing hired immigrant labor to a very large extent, particularly tailors who came
to America with training and who worked In the production of coats that were traded nationally.
Printing and publishing, at the other end of the spectrum, hired more highly educated laborers
and very few Immigrants — only 2 percent of its work force were new and recent immigrants
(Table 3, col. 3). The product was often locally-consumed newspapers. Bread and other bakery
products, like mens clothing, had large numbers of immigrants among Its workers, was found in
virtually every city, and like printing and publishing, its product was generally nontraded.
Foundries hired a mixture of skills, and produced a nationally traded good. Although foundry
laborers were disproportionately new and recent immigrants, few machinists were. Product
demand is important in understanding the impact of immigration on the wages of natives.
Immigrants increase the demand for all types of goods but their impact on local wages will be
greater and more positive, if these goods are produced locally. In terms of the two main
determinants of the impact of immigration on wages, the four Industries considered here can be
categorized by the following matrix:
Immigrants as a % of the Labor Force
Product Below Above
avHrH --u--
I nr'al Printing RakPry
Natinnal Fnune1ric Cinthing
.JmficI
The Economic Impact of Immigration on Local Labor Markets
The objective of this section Is to estimate the impact of immigration on the wage
outcomes of native-born workers, in part to assess whether immigration restriction was motivated
by economic concerns. Immigration to particular cities, like that to particular countries, was not
exogenous. Rather, immigrants went to cities that had the highest wages. Thus a simple cross-
section regression of city-level wages on the percentage immigrant yields a strong positive
coefficient, as is apparent in the regression coefficients in Table 5.
Certain cities could have had higher demand curves for less skilled labor than did others.Table 5
Cross-Sectional Relationship between Immigrant Flow and City Wages
A. Regression of hourly wages on fraction immigrant [(foreign born in t+10 - foreign born in t)/(average
population from t to t+10)), by city for various occupations, 1890 to 1910
Using 1893 Wage, No. Obs. Using 1903 Wage, No. Obs.
Occupations Elasticit? Elasticit?
Laborers and
hod carriers 0.094 192 0.135 192
Building trades and
machinists 0.101 278 0.082 278
B. Regression of annual earnings on fraction immigrant [(foreign born in t+ 10- foreign born in t)/(average
population from t to t+10)J, by city for various industries, 1900 to 1910






a The elasticities are evaluated at the means from a regression of thewage in the given year on the
percentage of the city population that was immigrant, where immigrant = (foreign born in year t+ 10) -
(foreign born in year t). The regressions are weighted by the number of workers in each occupation-city
cell or in each city-industry cell.
Sources:
By occupation: U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1905).
By industry: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures (various years)
Population: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population (various years).If this higher demand were a permanent feature of the city, as opposed to one that was transitory,
there Is a simple way around simuhaneity. The method Is to estimate a difference equation. The
difference In the (log of) wages for a group of workers Is regressed on the difference In the
percentage of the population (or the labor force) that is immigrant The procedure, which
estimates a fixed-effect model, assumes that, for each city i, the (log) wage at time t, (wa), is a
function of the percentage foreign born, (F), and an error term consisting of a portion that may
be correlated with Fft, (ci) or the fixed effect, and a portion that is not, (,.J:
In (wa) = so + s (F) + + (1)
If equation (1) were estimated, the coefficient of interest, , would be biased because cities that
have positive demand shocks will have both high wages and a high percentage foreign born. By
first differencing (and dropping the I subscripts) we get:
In (w+1tw1) = s (F+1 - F) + ,, that is
(2)
(see Altonji and Card 1991 for the functional form derivation). Note that , which under the
assumptions Is now unbiased, is the percentage change in the wage of a particular group (e.g.,
artisans, laborers, workers in some industry) In response to a percentage point change In the
proportion of the population (or labor force) that is foreign born.
Because immigrants can increase the demand for particular products and thus the labor
that produces them, as well as compete with or complement other labor, the sign of p is
ambiguous a pnorl.If the group in question is unskilled labor and if the foreign born are
disproportionately unskilled, then p can be less than or equal to zero. If the reference group
were skilled labor, however, p could be positive.
v If the error term also consisted of a time dependent component, not orthogonal to F it
would not be first differenced away and could serve to bias the coefficient. Transitoty demand
shocks would be such a factor and would serve to upwardly bias p.
There are two cases, one each for skilled and unskilled labor. Altonji and Card (1991)
present the unskilled case. The skilled case is easily derived from their model and is given by:
A log w=(Aj(1-a)/(1-a)J+ - ip..)J - ( - ,,)} Al/P
-19-In addition to the potential biases already mentioned Is the possibility that labor, either
native-born or prior immigrant workers, migrated from cities in which recent immigrants landed.
This bias would result if recent immigrants drove away previous workers by reducing wages,
increasing the price of housing, or through a general dislike of the newer immigrant groups. Such
groups would then decrease wages in other cities that had fewer immigrants. If mobile workers
tend to equalize wages across cities, the econometrician's data will show little or no effect when
there was a negative effect for all workers of that skill level. Spillovers of this type bias p
toward zero. The facts for the period under consideration, however, do not suggest that native-
born and already-settled foreign-born workers were moving away from areas to which recent
immigrants went in the 1900 to 1910 period. Rather, they were moving in. Although spillover
effects could still bias the relevant coefficient to zero, there is no evidence that the bias was
large.3°
The estimates of equation (2) are presented in Table 6 for the nonunion occupation
sample (1890 to 1907), the union occupation sample (1907 to 1923), and the industry sample
(1899 to 1914). The data for the percentage foreign born, from the census, is often, but not
always, for the nearest census dates. In most cases, the impact of immigration is allowed to take
where s = skilled labor, u = unskilled labor, a = proportion of population that is unskilled, a =
proportion of immigrants who are unskilled, the ,'s are usual elasticities of substitution, the i'S
are usual supply elasticities, I = immigrants, and P = population, and 0 s As 1. The A's are a
function of the degree to which the product is internally or externally consumed. To the extent
it is consumed by residents of the local labor market, the positive impact of immigration on wages
is enhanced. Note that ifis positive, that is the inputs are relative substitutes, the effect of
immigrants on the wages of the reference group must be s 0. Only if the inputs are relative
complements could the Impact of immigration on the wages of the reference group be positive.
Because immigrants were disproportionately unskilled, the impact of their increase on the wages
of the unskilled would have to be nonpositive. But there is reason to view the skilled and
unskilled as complementaJy, at least In the short run. If the goods produced by the skilled (e.g..
housing) are demanded by immigrants, the wages of the skilled could rise with increase
immigration.
The result will also hold if the effect were to increase wages in occupations having workers
complementary to immigrants.
3°See, for example, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992) on estimating the economic impact of
immigrants in a framework that attempts to circumvent the spillover problem.
-20-Table 6
Percentage Change in Wages with a Percentage Point Change in the Proportion Foreign Born:
City-Level Observations, 1890 to 1914, by Occupation or Industry
No. Obs.
By Occupation, Nonunion', Hourly Wage
Laborersb
1890to 1897 -0.010 (-0.053) 192
1890 to 1903 -1.02 (.2.98) 192
1890 to 1907 -1.60 (-3.39) 160
Artisansc
1890 to 1897 0.679 (2.92) 278
1890 to 1903 .0.539 (-1.88) 278
1890 to 1907 -0.145 (.0.33) 162
y Occupation, Union', Weekly Wage
Anisan
1907 to 1915 -1.44 (.3.27) 223
1909 to 1915 -1.20 (-3.58) 223
1907 to 1923 -1.60 (.2.81) 225
1909 to 1923 -1.41 (-2.65) 225
By Industry',AnnualWage
1899to 1914
Bread & bakery products 0.418 (0.69) 107
Clothing, mensd -3.06 (.2.45) 27
Foundry -0.829 (.1.92) 91
Printing & publishing 0.764 (1.47) 104
'The change in the percentage foreign born is for the 1890 to 1900 decade for the nonunion occupation
data, and 1910 to 1920 for the unionized occupation data. That by industry uses 1900 to 1910.
b Laborers include: laborers in building trades, in foundries, and in streets and sewer work (municipal city
and contract) and hod carriers.
C Nonunion artisans include: building tradesmen (bricklayers, carpenters, painters, plasterers, and
plumbers) and machinists in foundries. Union artisans include: bricklayers, carpenters, wiremen, painters,
steamfitters, and structural iron finishers.
d Excludes firms that do not remain in the sample to 1919 and the observation for New York City.
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. Regressions are estimated for each group of occupations or each
industry. The dependent variable is the difference in the log of wages between the end and beginning
years. All regressions have been weighted by the average number of sample workers in the interval,
except those for the union sample where the weights are the log of city population. The growth rate of
the white population (difference of the logs of the white population between the end and beginning years)
is also included as an independent variable in the regressions.
Sources:
By occupation, nonunion: 1890 to 1903, U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1905); 1907, Department of
Commerce and Labor (1908).
By occupation, union: data provided by Shawn Kantor, from U.S. Department of Labor (various years).
By industry: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures (various years).
Population: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population (various years).effect over several years (e.g.. 1890 to 1903 uses population data for 1890 and 1900).
The estimates of the impact of immigrants on the wages of laborers are generally negative
and often substantial, particularly for the period extending into the twentieth century. Only the
artisan sample covers both the 1890 to 1907 and the 1907 to 1923 periods, and it shows some
increase in magnitude with time. In general, a one percentage point increase in the population
share that was foreign born decreased wages by about 1 to 1.5 percent3'
Interestingly, the negative effects of immigration on the wages of both the unskilled and
skilled occupations for the 1890 to 1903 (or 1907) period were not recorded for the 1890 to 1897
pedod. Wages were extremely rigid during the period of the 1890s depression and only
began to respond to the various labor market shocks with the large change in prices after 1898.
Thus when the literacy test came before Congress for the first and second times (1897 and 1898).
capital may not yet have benefited from the wage effects of Immigration but labor was still reeling
from unemployment By 1904 when capital had swung to the pro-immigration, anti-literacy test
camp the wage effects were, in some cases, quite strong.
The industry results conform to the predictions regarding the roles of labor composition
and product demand. In mans clothing, which contained a large proportion of immigrants, wages
were distinctly depressed in cities having an increase in the percentage of their populations that
was foreign born from 1899 to 1909. The decrease is substantial: a 1 percentage point increase
In the fraction of the city's population that was foreign born decreased wages by about 1.5 to 3
' The union sample uses weekly rather than hourly wages, while that for the non-union
workers uses hourly wages. In the non-union sample, hourly wages are a separate entry,
whereas the union sample has weekly wages for a union contract as well as the contract hours
for the week. Regressions using the implied hourly wage do not yield coefficients that differ much
from those using the weekly wage for the union sample, but the standard errors are larger.
Note that the population data exist only for 1890 and 1900, but this is not the reason for
the differences between the 1890 to 1903 regressions and that for 1890 to 1897. The real reason
is to be found in the stickiness of wages, which may have been the single most important factor
giving rise to large unemployment In the 1 890s. A significant fraction of the cities had no change
In nominal wages from 1890 to 1897, but wages changed rapidly in the face of price changes
after 1897.
-21-percent. Foundries also Show negative and,attimes, statistically and quantitatively significant
coefficients. Because foundries hired both skilled (native) and unskilled (foreign-born) workers
(see Table 3), the results are even more supportive of the view that immigration severely
depressed the wages of less skilled labor.
The other two industries considered show small, generally insignificant, if not positive,
coefficients. The absence of a negative effect in printing and publishing, indeed the presence of
a positive effect, may not be surprising. Most printing establishments employed skilled and
native-born labor, and produced a locally consumed good the demand for which would have risen
with lmmigration. The sm* positive, but always statistically insignificant effects of Immigration
on the wages of workers In bakeries may, as In the printing and publishing case, be due to the
positive demand effect of immigration on a locally consumed good. Bread was, and Is, the st
of life, but was even more so for immigrant and poor populations in America3'
It should be noted that the generally negative Impact of immigration on the wages of both
lower-skilled and higher-skilled workers could not be caused by the simple addition to the working
population of lower-waged workers The mean wage Is no more than a simple average ci the
wages of native and foreign-born workers. If immigrants earn less than natives by virtue ci their
lack of certain skills or by dint of labor market discrimination, then the mean wage will be
depressed by the increase in foreign-born workers. But the depressing impact of the foreign born
on the wage occurs for the artisan group, which included very few of the new and recent foreign
3'The largest positive effect would occur in an industry hiring both skilled and unskilled (or
native and immigrant) labor In which the two types of labor are complementary and the good Is
locally consumed in its entirety, if the wages of only the skilled workers were considered. The
data, however, consist of a labor force-weighted average of the wages of all workers In the
industry.
3' In a simple model of local labor markets the nature of product demand alone cannot
generate a positive impact of Immigration on wages; one needs complementarity of demand
between immigrants and the labor in the occupation or industry. In the case of printing and
publishing there were probably both effects. In the case of bakeries It Is less likely that both
effects operated and thus the existence of a positive coefficient is curious. Even if the wages of
(skilled) labor hired by an industry were unaffected by the increase in (primarily unskilled)
immigrants, the coefficient would be zero, not positive. See, for example, Altonji and Card (1991).
-22-born (see Table 3). The difference in wages between immigrant and native for the same
occupation would have to be extremely high to account for the large negative impact of
immigration on wages in general and even for those occupations In which the foreign born were
a large percentage.
Explaining the 1915 Vote to Override Wdsons Veto
The wage effects of the foreign born suggest a role for economic forces in the movement
to restrict immigration. The underlying model is one in which constituents urge their
Representative to vote for restriction (that is, to pass the literacy test or to override a Presidential
veto) with more force the lower Is the Increase in wages (or the greater is the decrease in wages).
The foreign born may be the cause of the wage change or they may be the scapegoats for other
economic influences. But, at the same time, If a large enough fraction of the constituents were
themselves foreign born, they would probably urge their Representative to vote against restriction.
Table 7 explores these two factors in determining the House vote In 1915 on the override of
President Wilson's first veto of the literacy test The data are by city for the union-occupation
sample, whereas the votes are by Congressional district. I have matched the cities to the districts
in the 63rd Congress. For those cities covering more than one Congressional district, the
dependent variable is the fraction of Representatives who voted to override the veto. The
estimation is performed for all city-occupation observations In the union data set and for the
nonSouth subset as well. Southern cities were typically small and voted overwhelmingly to
override Wilson's veto.
In both samples (all cities and the nonSouth) an increase in the wage by occupation, from
1907 to 1915, decreased the proportion of votes for the override. A vote for the override was a
vote against open Immigration, thus the lower the wage Increase, the less support for open
Immigration. Increasing the wage change by one standard deviation In the nonSouth sample (a
13 percent increase) would decrease the percentage voting against open Immigration by 12
-23-Table 7
Explaining the House Vote in 1915 on the Uteracy Test
AU Cities NonSouth Means
s.e. s.e. AllNonSouth
Dependent variable: Vote to
override Presidential veto 0402b 0.344
Log (population1910) -0.114 (0.034) -0.0552 (0.036) 12.612.9
(FB1- FB1910)1FB1910° 0.268 (0.104) -0.0480 (0.122) 0.082 0.088
Proportion foreign born in populatlon:d
= 0 < .1 0.442 (0.120) 0.124 (0.206) 0.287 0.029
I = .1 < .2 0.265 (0.110) 0.402 (0.114) 0.244 0.271
1 = .2 < .3 0.256 (0.099) 0.336 (0.092) 0.3210.479
Log (wage1g,wage,,7)° .0.461 (0.219) -0.913 (0.256) 0.179 0.173
Proportion In political party:'
Republican 0.181 (0.080) 0.210 (0.074) 0.248 0.354
Third Party° 0.492 (0.123) 0.436 (0.120) 0.065 0.096
Constant 1.52(0.491) 0.799 (0.517)
0.25 0.31
Number of observations 209 140
Notes: Also included is a dummy variable for the city of Boston.
Sources: Voting data from Congressional Record; wage data from source in Table 6.
A vote to override the Presidential veto (1 = vote to override) was a vote for immigration restriction.
Most cities in the sample contain one congressional district, but almost all of the large cities contain
several. A split vote was treated as the fraction voting for the override. Absent congressmen who
paired, in this case pairs were actually 2 to 1 • were allocated on the basis of their stated preference
for or against the override. There were very few congressmen absent for this vote; see Table 1.
b The percentage voting to override the veto was considerably smaller in this sample than in the nation
as a whole because urban congressmen voted more overwhelmingly against immigration restriction than
did congressmen from rural America.
FB = foreign born
d Cities with more than 30% foreign born are the omitted class. Foreign born is as of the 1920 census,
because immigration was very low after 1914 to the end of World War I. The figure in 1920 census,
therefore, most accurately reflects the composition of cities in 1915, at the time of the vote.
• The wage change is by city for the union occupations described in the notes to Table 6. There can be
several observations per city, depending on the number of occupations represented in the sample.
Democrat is the omitted political party. In cities having more than 1 congressional district, these
variables are the proportion of each political party in all the districts comprising the city. Thus, these are
not true dummy variables, although there are few cities having Representatives from different parties.
Third parties include Progressive and Progressive Republican.percentage points. The percentage foreign born in the city was an even more powerful
determinant of the vote. The proportion foreign born is divided into 4 groups, which in the total
sample about evenly divide the cities. In the nonSouth group, however, there are very few In the
smallest class of percent foreign born. With the exception of these few small cities, increasing
the percentage foreign born greatly decreases the probability of voting against the override.
When the foreign born are about 30 percent of the total population, almost all Representatives
vote against the override.
The estimation underscores the critical Importance of reinforcing flows of immigration in
building and maintaining the open Immigrant vote. Flows that were reinforcing Increased the
fraction foreign born to the critical level needed to produce votes against overriding the veto.
Flows that diluted, however, raised the proportion foreign born in the intermediate range, but not
to the higher level required to keep the restrictionist forces at bay. Recall that flows were
reinforcing from 1900 to 1910 but were dilLiting from 1910 to 1920. Had the distribution of
percentage foreign born been at Its 1910 level, rather than the level recorded by 1920, the vote
for restriction would have been reduced by about one-third in the sample cities. Note, as well,
the Importance of the (log of) 1910 population variable. The greater the total population, the lower
Is the vote to override, that is the greater Is the expressed sentiment for open Immigration. The
reason complements that on the percentage foreign born. With a greater population there is
more room for minorities segregated In enclaves to gain a Representative.
Using the 1910 figures, 43% of the nonSouth cities (actually city-occupation observations)
had percentage foreign born > 30%, but only 22% did using the 1920 fIgures. Multiplying the
percentages in the dummy foreign-born categories by the coefficients in Table 7 and difterencing
yields an increase of 0.0785 from 1910 to 1920 for the nonSouth sample. The 1915 vote in the
nonSouth urban sample is 0.344. If the 1910 percentage foreign born data were used, the vote
would have been 0.266 or 30% less.
-24-Summary and Conclusions
The curtailment of immigration, codified in the 1921 Emergency Quota Act and in
subsequent laws culminating in the National Origins Act, was heralded for twenty-five years. That
immigration was not restricted from sometime in the mid-i 890s to World War I was the result of
shifting political interests, generally good times, and a lot of good luck for Europe's poor and
oppressed.
Restrictive legislation was almost passed in 1897 and again in 1898. Had but two
members of the House changed sides in 1898 the literacy test would have become law. It is
doubtful that Mckinley, having run on a platform calling for the literacy test — the only such
platform in the pre-restriction period - would have vetoed it Restrictionist sentiment then abated.
An economic recovery turned the interests of capital around, and the flood of immigrants of the
early 1 900s reinforced pro-immigration constituencies in various big-city districts. But the rest of
America moved toward restriction. The South had been lost by the 1906 vote at the latest. The
new immigrants had gone North and West, rarely South, and were, to southern eyes, too dark to
be assimilable. The rest of urban and industrial America felt some downward pressure on
wages from the new immigrants but not the political pressure from the vast numbers that
clustered in the big-city districts. Capital maintained its pro-immigration stance to the bitter end,
when all but the big-city vote went to the anti-immigrant camp. The period from the 1913 vote
to that which was successful In 1917 was just a matter of waiting for some exogenous force — an
economic downturn, a war, a rash of labor unrest — to close the door. That 17 million slipped
through from 1897 is the miracle.
This study has looked primarily at urban votes and the twin forces of economics and
demography in the drive for immigration restriction. Although the American population was still
See, for example, the speech of Senator Simmons of North Carolina during the 1906
debates in which he said: The broad fact, then, is that about two-thirds of all the immigration
to this country to-day and during recent years has come from southern and eastern Europe...
They belong.. . to a different civilization from that represented by the Anglo-Saxon race (U.S.
Congress, Congressional Record Senate, vol. ?, p. 7295).
-25-predominantly rural in 1910. the battle for immigration restriction was fought in the cities. Rural
America was almost uniformly in favor of immigration restriction as early as the 1897 vote. Only
the South switched sides, joining the American heartland In its opposition to unrestricted
Immigration. Urban America moved strongly Into the pro-Immigration camp as its ever-Increasing
foreign born constituency gained the vote. But even in the nation's large cities, the economic
impact of immigrants on the economic status of native-born workers heavily impacted pro-
immigration sentiment. And it was the withering away of the urban pro-immigration vote that
ultimately closed the door.
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